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The average American became better edu-
cated in the 1990s. The number of U.S. adults with
at least a bachelor’s degree jumped 38 percent
between 1990 and 2000, while the number with-
out a high school diploma fell. Entering the 21st
century, the average American had more than a
year of postsecondary education.
The average education of the adult popula-
tion increased in every state and the District of
Columbia. However, as Chart 1 shows, some states
improved much more than others. Intriguingly,
gains in average educational attainment were 
systematically lower in the West and Southwest. 
In particular, Alaska, California and Nevada posted
less than half the national gain. California, which
ranked 14th in the nation in terms of average 
educational attainment in 1990, slipped to 29th 
by 2000. Texas dropped seven places to 42nd.
Why did the West and Southwest lag the rest
of the nation? There are two key factors: The adult
population without a diploma did not decline, and
the share of the population with at least a bache-
lor’s degree did not rise as rapidly as elsewhere in
the country.
After almost 20 years of trying, in late 1999 Congress finally repealed the
Glass–Steagall Act and parts of the Bank Holding Company Act, which had
separated traditional banking, insurance and securities underwriting into three,
nonoverlapping industries.
1 The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,
also known as Gramm–Leach–Bliley, was hailed as a major step toward 
ending government regulation that was initially imposed following the stock
market collapse in the late 1920s and the ensuing Great Depression. Pro-
ponents claimed that eliminating the artificial barriers that divided the finan-
cial sector into distinct industries would increase competition, thus gener-
ating greater efficiencies and economies of scale and benefiting consumers
and the economy.
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Leach–Bliley’s passage, the media are
focused on the fact that many of its
touted benefits have yet to be realized.
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Large-scale mergers and consolidations
in the financial services industry have
not occurred, expanded product lines
and one-stop financial shopping have
not developed, and prices for financial
services have not fallen substantially. In
addition, banks have been accused of
conflicts of interest between their com-
mercial lending and investment banking
divisions. This has emboldened consumer
advocates and some in Congress to call
for reestablishing some of the barriers
Gramm–Leach–Bliley eliminated.
This article explores three primary
reasons the benefits of Gramm–Leach–
Bliley have yet to be fully realized. First,
the Glass–Steagall restrictions that sepa-
rated commercial and investment bank-
ing had been slowly eroded over the last
20 years. Thus, Gramm–Leach–Bliley was
not as sweeping a piece of legislation as
often billed. Second, the recent economic
downturn and corporate accounting and
governance scandals have inhibited the
industry’s ability to realize some of the
gains from the recent legislation. Third,
the writing of regulations fleshing out
Gramm–Leach–Bliley has also taken time.
Those who anticipated fast, extensive
changes in the financial sector landscape
had unrealistic expectations. Despite the
slow progress of reform, however, bene-
fits from Gramm–Leach–Bliley have be-
gun to materialize and are likely to in-
crease as the economy improves and
banks determine how to best take ad-
vantage of their newfound freedom.
Historical Perspective
To understand the impact of Gramm–
Leach–Bliley, it’s useful to trace the history
of Glass–Steagall and examine how the
banking industry evolved during the 1990s.
The Banking Act of 1933, often re-
ferred to as the Glass–Steagall Act in the
popular press, did three important things.
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First, it established the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp. Second, it gave the Fed-
eral Reserve’s Federal Open Market Com-
mittee the authority to conduct open
market operations. (Monetary policy was
previously conducted via the discount
window.) Third, and most important 
for this article, the act erected barriers
separating commercial and investment
banking. (It is only this part of the Bank-
ing Act that technically constitutes Glass–
Steagall.) Specifically, commercial banks
were barred from underwriting or even
dealing with corporate, but not govern-
ment, securities. This division kept banks
and investment firms from competing
with each other.
Glass–Steagall’s passage was largely
a result of the public’s misconception
that commercial banks were chiefly
responsible for the stock market crash.
This idea gained considerable support
after congressional hearings (by the Pec-
ora Committee) documented numerous
abuses by banks with regard to their
investment dealings—not unlike the cur-
rent scrutiny of bank lending to corpora-
tions such as Enron Corp.
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More recently, the 1990s were an
extremely good period for the banking
sector. Although the decade’s strong 
economic growth is often attributed to
technology, the New Economy and gov-
ernment spending restraint, an often over-
looked, but crucially important, contrib-
utor to that prosperity was a sound and
effective banking sector. The decade
started with the winding down of the
cleanup of the savings and loan crisis,
which had begun in the 1980s. As the
economy embarked on its historic growth
streak, the banking sector also grew and
prospered.
Congress passed significant reform
legislation in the 1990s. In 1994, the
Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act repealed the
McFadden Act of 1927 and Douglas
Amendments of 1970, which had cur-
tailed interstate banking. In particular,
the McFadden Act, seeking to level the
playing field between national and state
banks with respect to branching, had
effectively prohibited interstate branch
banking.
5 Starting in 1997, banks were
allowed to own and operate branches 
in different states. This immediately trig-
gered a dramatic increase in mergers and
acquisitions. The banking system began
to consolidate and for the first time form
true national banking institutions, such as
Bank of America, formed via the merger
of BankAmerica and NationsBank.
The decade ended with the passage
of Gramm–Leach–Bliley in November
1999. The impact of this legislation was
not felt until 2000, as the Federal Reserve
Board and the Treasury Department re-
quired time to finalize some of the regu-
lations necessary to implement it. Thus,
the 1990s were characterized by pros-





had argued that a number of benefits
would result from deregulating the finan-
cial sector and tearing down the artificial
barriers erected by Glass–Steagall and
the Bank Holding Company Act.
By eliminating the barriers between
commercial banking and investment
banking, the two sectors would provide
greater competition for each other. This
would lower prices as banks aggres-
sively competed to underwrite securities
and investment banks offered deposit
and lending services currently offered by
commercial banks.
Proponents also expected consider-
able consolidation in the financial sector.
As banks, investment companies and in-
surance companies expanded into each
other’s territory, it was thought that much
of this expansion would occur through
mergers because companies would find it
more cost-efficient to buy existing firms
than to start new divisions from scratch.
This consolidation would also benefit
the economy as these new, large firms
achieved economies of scale and passed
these efficiency gains on to consumers and
businesses. It would also be beneficial to
the financial companies because their ex-
panded service offerings would provide
greater diversification of assets and risks.
Finally, by allowing banks to offer
products such as brokerage services and
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nies would be created. These new finan-
cial supermarkets would benefit consumers
and businesses by reducing the costs
associated with obtaining a variety of ser-
vices from a diverse group of providers.
Financial Deregulation Reality
Three years after Gramm–Leach–
Bliley’s passage, many of these expected
gains are still largely unrealized. In par-
ticular, the mergers and consolidation
have not materialized and the creation 
of one-stop financial centers has been
limited. However, as detailed in the next
section, it was somewhat unrealistic to
expect large gains this quickly.
The lack of consolidation within the
financial services industry is evidenced by
the general absence of large-scale merg-
ers across industry boundaries. The most
notable exception is Citigroup—formed
in 1998 from a merger of Citicorp, a bank
holding company, and Travelers Group,
an insurance company.
6 However, in mid-
2002 Citigroup spun off Travelers’ prop-
erty-casualty insurance business.
In general, though, much of the
recent merger activity is due to the 1994
repeal of branch banking restrictions 
and other competitive forces rather than
Gramm–Leach–Bliley. Mergers peaked
(in dollar terms) in 1998 at $1,013 billion,
with only $27 billion in the first three
quarters of 2002 (Chart 1).
7 The number
of mergers displayed a similar pattern. 
In the mid-1990s, 600 banks per year
were acquired as a result of mergers.
More recently, that number has dropped
to around 350 banks per year.
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This lack of merger activity between
industries has also slowed the creation of
one-stop financial centers. Citigroup, by
virtue of its merger prior to Gramm–
Leach–Bliley, is perhaps the furthest along
in terms of having banking, insurance and
investment banking under one roof. Other
large firms—such as J.P. Morgan Chase
& Co., FleetBoston Financial Corp. and
State Farm—have succeeded in marry-
ing investment, commercial banking and
insurance in a more limited fashion. As
of September 2002, 145 investment com-
panies were part of larger financial hold-
ing companies. However, only 55 of 612
financial holding companies—a new cate-
gory of financial services providers ex-
plained below—had investment subsidi-
aries (Chart 2). Although these compa-
nies represent some of the largest financial
companies, the fact that only the largest
firms are testing the integration waters—
and only to limited degrees—indicates
the slowness with which one-stop financial
centers are being developed (Chart 3).
Why Progress Is Slow
Although the benefits from Gramm–
Leach–Bliley seem to be slow in coming,
the sluggish pace should not be attributed
to a failure of deregulation. There are three
key reasons the effects of this legislation
have been muted: (1) the barriers be-
tween banking, insurance and securities
had slowly eroded over time, (2) the re-
cent economic downturn and corporate
scandals have hampered banks’, insur-
ance companies’ and investment banks’
ability to take advantage of the recent
legislation, and (3) the issuance of regu-
lations has taken time and is, in fact, not
yet complete.
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NOTES: 2002 data are for the first three quarters. Dollar value of mergers is for the 50 largest bank holding companies.
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NOTE: A financial holding company (FHC) is the legal structure required for a bank or other institution to engage in brokerage services,
insurance services or other financial activity under Gramm–Leach–Bliley.
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.Although proponents hailed Gramm–
Leach–Bliley for breaking down artificial
barriers that had stood for over half a
century, the reality is that decisions by
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
had slowly chipped away at those barri-
ers over the previous two decades. In
1987 the Board allowed subsidiaries of
bank holding companies to do limited
securities underwriting. This activity was
initially limited to 5 percent of the securi-
ties subsidiary’s revenues but was in-
creased to 10 percent in 1989 and then
25 percent in 1996. In addition, banks
slowly expanded into related areas, such
as mutual funds and insurance.
Under Gramm–Leach–Bliley, the first
step to offering a diverse portfolio of
financial products is receiving the new
designation of financial holding com-
pany (FHC). In the past, the least restric-
tive designation for banks was bank
holding company.
9 Current bank holding
companies or other institutions seeking
the new designation must pass basic re-
views of financial soundness. As of Sep-
tember 2002, 584 domestic banks and 
28 foreign institutions had been desig-
nated as financial holding companies.
This compares with 5,137 total domestic
bank holding companies and 18 partly
or wholly owned foreign institutions.
Although the number of financial hold-
ing companies represents about 12 per-
cent of bank holding companies, it is un-
likely to grow dramatically in the near
future. Of the 612 financial holding com-
panies, approximately 477 were granted
this status during the first year after
Gramm–Leach–Bliley’s passage and only
135 have obtained this designation in 
the last two years (Chart 2). It should 
be noted, however, that institutions that
have received financial holding company
status represent the country’s largest banks
and financial companies.
The second reason the full ramifica-
tions of Gramm–Leach–Bliley have not
been felt is the current spate of corporate
scandals and the recent economic down-
turn, which have reduced mergers and
slowed the expansion of products. Overall,
however, the banking sector has weath-
ered the slowdown remarkably well.
As with the rest of the economy, the
stock market’s woes have affected the
value of bank stocks, albeit to a lesser
degree lately (Chart 4 ). Bank stocks ex-
perienced a dramatic run-up in the mid-
1990s and then fell significantly between
late 1998 and early 2000. It is no coinci-
dence that within the last half decade,
stock prices and the dollar value of
mergers peaked in the same year, 1998.
As with many industries, banks used
highly valued stocks to acquire other
banks (as opposed to issuing debt to pay
cash). Thus, when stock prices came off
their highs in 1998, banks were less able
to afford mergers and acquisitions.
The economic slowdown has also
caused a deterioration in loan quality.
The number of delinquencies (missed
payments) and charge-offs (uncollectible
loans) on loans to commercial and in-
dustrial businesses and consumers has
risen dramatically since 1998 (Chart 5).
This loan deterioration has prompted
banks to set aside larger reserves to cover
expected losses. Given the situation, banks
are understandably much more leery of
mergers and acquisitions and of expan-
sion into highly volatile areas such as
insurance and investment banking.
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Only the Largest FHCs Testing the Integration Waters
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Bank Stocks Hold Up Better than the Overall Market



















SOURCE: Standard & Poor’s.The recent rash of corporate govern-
ance scandals has also ensnared the bank-
ing industry. Given that Glass–Steagall
was a response to alleged abuses by
commercial banks with respect to invest-
ment banking, it is rather foreboding 
that only a few years after its repeal, the
industry finds itself with similar prob-
lems. Large banks have been under
attack on several fronts. On the account-
ing side, Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase
have been accused of dubious lending
deals with Enron. Commercial banks
have come under scrutiny for tying loans
to investment banking activities and for
alleged conflicts of interest between
research reports and investment banking
opportunities. The latter has resulted in
some banks, such as Citigroup (and its
investment arm, Salomon Smith Barney),
and some investment companies, such
as Merrill Lynch, paying large fines. In
addition, these companies are considering
the degree to which they should make
their research departments more autono-
mous or even independent.
The economic downturn and scan-
dals have led banks to severely curtail or
even reverse recent expansion beyond
their traditional banking boundaries. As
mentioned above, Citigroup has already
spun off part of its insurance business.
FleetBoston Financial recently closed its
investment banking division, Robertson
Stephens, because of the nonexistent
market for initial public offerings. Bank
of America eliminated its auto leasing
and subprime mortgage lending divi-
sions because of the weak economy. But
although many banks are refocusing on
their core business rather than expanding
into new territories, once the economy
gains momentum, they are likely to test the
waters of expansion more aggressively.
The final reason Gramm–Leach–
Bliley has taken time to implement is
that some provisions are being phased 
in and others have been delayed while
various government agencies create and
refine regulations to carry out the law.
Since different agencies (for example, the
Federal Reserve, the Treasury Depart-
ment, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission) have oversight responsi-
bility for commercial banks, insurance
companies and investment banks, the
task was further delayed as the agencies
coordinated their regulations.
As previously discussed, the first step
to offering a diverse portfolio of financial
products is being designated a financial
holding company. Although satisfying
the requirements is not onerous, compa-
nies could not apply for this status until
the end of the first quarter of 2000, when
the applicable regulations were finalized.
In addition, several layers of regulations
govern the various subsidiaries of finan-
cial holding companies. For example, fi-
nancial holding companies are allowed
to engage in merchant banking, which
involves directly investing in companies,
but the relevant regulations were not
finalized until early 2001.
10 And Gramm–
Leach–Bliley gives the Federal Reserve
and Treasury until 2004 to decide
whether banks, in addition to financial
holding companies, may engage in mer-
chant banking.
The Treasury still has to decide
whether to allow banks to engage in real
estate brokerage.
11 Gramm–Leach–Bliley
states that banks should be allowed to
engage in any activity that is “financial 
in nature.” However, the legislation does
not define this term, leaving it to the
Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury
to jointly determine an appropriate list of
activities. So some activities, such as real
estate brokerage, must go through the
arduous and time-consuming process of
first being designated as financial in
nature before banks are allowed to
engage in them.
12
Insurance is one of the few markets
in which banks have expanded more
aggressively. Here again, however, there
are regulatory barriers, primarily reflecting
the hodgepodge of state-by-state regula-
tions. Thus, although Gramm–Leach–
Bliley requires that states permit banks
to sell insurance, banks must still adhere
to the same regulations as all other in-
surance companies in each state.
Deregulation Taking Hold
The three years since the passage of
Gramm–Leach–Bliley have seen steady
but slow progress toward reintegrating
the many distinct industries that make 
up the financial sector. Although some
expected immediate, large-scale changes
in the commercial banking, insurance
and investment banking industries, that
has not been the case.
The mergers and consolidation some
anticipated have not occurred, and finan-
cial supermarkets offering all financial
products under one roof have not devel-
oped. However, the lack of progress in
these areas does not indicate a failure on
the part of deregulation. There are many
solid economic reasons for the slow pace.
One of the key reasons Gramm–
Leach–Bliley did not cause a flurry of
activity across traditional banking, insur-
ance and brokerage boundaries is that the
barriers separating the three had already
begun to fall. Banks did not suddenly
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS   SOUTHWEST ECONOMY   JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003 9
Bank Loans Continue to Deteriorate

















SOURCE: Federal Reserve Board.
(Continued on page 12)Robert D. McTeer, Jr.
President and Chief Executive Officer
Helen E. Holcomb
First Vice President and
Chief Operating Officer
Harvey Rosenblum
Senior Vice President and 
Director of Research
Robert D. Hankins
Senior Vice President, 
Banking Supervision
W. Michael Cox

























published six times annually 
by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas. The views expressed
are those of the authors and
should not be attributed to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
or the Federal Reserve System. 
Articles may be reprinted
on the condition that the
source is credited and a copy
is provided to the Research
Department of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas. 
Southwest Economy is
available free of charge by
writing the Public Affairs
Department, Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas, P.O. Box 655906,
Dallas, TX 75265-5906, or by
telephoning (214) 922-5254.
This publication is available 
on the Internet at
www.dallasfed.org.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
achieve the ability to sell stocks and
bonds; their securities subsidiaries were
now allowed to generate more than 
25 percent of their revenue from such
activities. Consequently, the industry has
seen slow expansion across boundaries,
as opposed to wholesale changes in pro-
ducts and services.
The recent economic downturn,
coupled with accounting and investment
scandals, has also dampened banks’ abil-
ity and desire to create and support new
products in which their expertise is lim-
ited. Finally, the removal of barriers was
not intended to be accomplished over a
relatively short period. Congress used
general language in much of the legis-
lation to give regulators the flexibility to
adapt to ever-changing market forces.
However, this flexibility has a price—the
time it takes different agencies to develop
and agree on regulations.
As regulations and their interpreta-
tions are made clear and the economy
revives, financial companies that fulfill
the promise of Gramm–Leach–Bliley are
likely to be formed, furthering competi-
tion in the financial sector.
—Mark G. Guzman
Guzman is an economist in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Dallas.
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3 See Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and
Financial Markets, 5th edition, Addison-Wesley, New York, 1997, for
more detailed explanations regarding important banking legislation.
4 It is not clear, in hindsight, that banks did anything wrong. See Ran-
dall S. Kwoszner and Raghuram G. Rajan, “Is the Glass–Steagall 
Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking
Before 1933,” American Economic Review, September 1994, for a
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5 Not all interstate branching was eliminated, as various states entered
into regional pacts that allowed some interstate branching or holding
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6 This merger occurred prior to Gramm–Leach–Bliley and was one of
the primary forces in getting the legislation through Congress. If not
for Gramm–Leach–Bliley, Citigroup would have been required to
divest itself of its insurance underwriting.
7 These dollar figures are for the 50 largest bank holding companies in
the United States.
8 Standard & Poor’s Industry Surveys: Banking, Nov. 7, 2002.
9 Bank holding companies themselves were largely the result of banks
attempting to circumvent the interstate branching restrictions imposed
by the McFadden Act.
10 See Kenneth J. Robinson, “Banks Venture into New Territory,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic and Financial Policy Review, vol. 1,
no. 2, 2002, for a more detailed exposition of merchant banking and
how banks have pursued this new authority since Gramm–
Leach–Bliley’s passage.
11 See Karen Couch, Robert Mahalik and Robert R. Moore, “Banks 
as Real Estate Brokers—Letting Free Enterprise Work,” Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Southwest Economy, May/June 2001, for a
more detailed overview of the banking industry’s struggle to obtain
permission to engage in real estate brokerage services.
12 Bills were introduced in the newly convened 108th Congress (in both
the House and Senate) to prohibit banks from engaging in real estate
brokerage.
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